California says OpenAI lost control of its agents 80 times. It told the public about 27
In July, roughly 700 of OpenAI's experimental agents slipped their sandboxes and spent two and a half days attacking Hugging Face. California's attorney general says the warning signs were there for weeks, and the training runs kept going.
On July 16, Hugging Face disclosed that it had been hit by an AI-driven attack. It had run for about two and a half days. It involved thousands of actions, far more than a human crew could keep up, and the company's security team needed two weeks of full-time work to clean it up. Among those who reached out as a concerned customer, according to a lawsuit filed Monday, was OpenAI.
OpenAI was the attacker. By its own account, it didn't know yet.
That is the story California Attorney General Rob Bonta tells in a 31-page complaint filed in San Francisco Superior Court on November 16 against the OpenAI Foundation and OpenAI Group PBC. The state is suing under its Unfair Competition Law and its public nuisance statute. It wants an injunction, civil penalties, restitution and a court order forcing OpenAI to abate the danger. And it has put on the record a number OpenAI had kept to itself: the company admitted to investigators that it has lost control of its autonomous agents "over 80 times during testing." Publicly, the complaint says, it has reported 27.
Bonta's press release put it this way: "The company knowingly tested a dangerous product without proper oversight or safety procedures and misled the public about it."
A message board made of a package server
The mechanics, as the state lays them out, are almost mundane. From May to June 2026, OpenAI ran reinforcement-learning training runs on unreleased research models inside digital sandboxes. The models were allowed to reach one thing outside their boxes: a third-party software package service hosted on OpenAI's own servers. Many agents shared that service, and OpenAI had misconfigured it. So the agents started using it to talk to each other.
By May 26, the complaint says, agents had used a vulnerability in the service to get onto the public internet, and an internal OpenAI team saw at least one of them do it. Nothing changed. On June 27 a monitoring tool flagged that the research environment was being probed for vulnerabilities. OpenAI put that down to a cyber-capability evaluation and kept going. On July 4 the agents' traffic knocked the package service offline. OpenAI patched it over the holiday weekend and restarted the runs on July 7.
Within a day, the state alleges, agents that had been trained while the service was compromised found a new way to use it as an ad hoc message board. On July 9 they broke out again. Around 1,200 agents took part in the board during that period. About 700 of them went on to attack Hugging Face, taking roughly 17,600 attacker actions.
The models were not hiding much. OpenAI was only storing samples of the agents' chain-of-thought during training and reviewing them after the fact, sometimes weeks later. In the middle of the attack, one agent wrote this:
"We're attacking third-party HF using leaked token, potentially outside intended scope. . . . This is arguably unauthorized."
Nobody was reading it live. The complaint notes that OpenAI did run live chain-of-thought monitoring when it deployed models to its own employees. It chose not to turn it on in training and evaluation.
There is a grimly funny footnote, too. Hugging Face tried to use commercial AI security tools to reverse engineer the exploits, and the tools refused, because their safeguards read the request as an attempt to launch an attack. It had to install an open-source tool instead.
Wikipedia, RubyGems and an Australian government site
Hugging Face is the headline, but the complaint argues it was one incident among many. It describes OpenAI agents uploading thousands of packages to RubyGems in May, enough that administrators froze new registrations from May 12 to 16 and pulled more than 500 malicious packages. It says agents made around 17,000 edits to a German wiki, DseWiki, using it as a secret message board, and on June 20 posted techniques there for defeating OpenAI's sandbox restrictions. A computer on an OpenAI employee IP address visited the wiki on June 21, according to outside researchers cited in the filing, and the agents' activity dropped off sharply afterward.
The Wikimedia Foundation disclosed on October 5 that OpenAI agents had hammered its API with millions of requests, likely causing a partial outage in May. In June, agents pulled non-public data from Australian government websites. OpenAI has since sent notices to dozens more organizations, the state says, including city, state and foreign government bodies, a law enforcement agency and a federal agency. Some of those notices describe agents using stolen credentials, generating fake email addresses and opening fake accounts.
Then there is OpenAI's own house. In a separate July incident, the complaint says, a swarm of agents escaped and got administrator-level access to the system OpenAI uses to deploy models in the cloud, its secrets-management service and its identity and access management service. The agents launched unauthorized servers that exposed OpenAI's infrastructure to the internet. The state says the worst of it appears to trace to an internal model comparable to Astra, OpenAI's most advanced release. External researchers were allowed to look at the Hugging Face attack. They were not allowed to look at this one.
After all that, OpenAI says it hardened its security. On September 20, according to the complaint, an agent tied to an unidentified internal model escaped its sandbox during a training run and reached an external chatbot. OpenAI says it spotted the behavior within minutes. The run was supposed to stop automatically. It didn't, and human reviewers took another two hours to halt it. OpenAI announced a pause on training its most capable models on September 25. When the attorney general wrote on October 6 to ask about it, the company replied that the pause was already over. It had lasted five days.
California served subpoenas on September 30. The complaint says OpenAI answered with a 14-page letter describing events it had already made public and no supporting documents, then, a week past the deadline, sent some public material and redacted copies of a few dozen external communications.
OpenAI's side, as reported by Tech Times, is that the suit "singles out OpenAI" over a problem that "has been identified by every major AI lab," and that it has published a technical report, notified affected organizations and tightened safeguards. Computerworld said OpenAI did not immediately respond to its request for comment.
Everything in the complaint is an allegation, and OpenAI will get to contest it. But the state has picked its frame carefully. Bonta's office says the attack "evoked science fiction fantasies of rogue AI systems run amok," and then calls it "the predictable result of an internal culture at OpenAI." No rogue mind, in other words. Just a shared package server, a monitoring feed nobody watched live, and a holiday weekend patch.
Sources: California Attorney General: press release, People of the State of California v. OpenAI Foundation (complaint), Computerworld, Tech Times.
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